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PROTECTING GROUP DYNAMIC 
INFORMATION IN LARGE SCALE MULTICAST 
GROUPS 
Yongdong WU', Tieyan ~ i ' ,  and Robert H.   en^^ 
'~nstititue for Infocomm ~ e s e a r c h ( ~ ~ ~ ) ,  Singapore, (wydong,litieyan)@i2r.a-star.edu,sg; 
2~chool  of information Systems, Singapore Management Univerist, robertdeng@smu.edu.sg 
Abstract: Existing key management schemes can secure group communication efficiently, 
but are failed on protecting the Group Dynamic Information (GDI) that may 
undermine group privacy. Recently, Sun et al.' proposed a scheme to hide the 
GDI with batch updating and phantom members inserting so that an adversary is 
not able to estimate the number of group members. In this paper, we first point 
out that their scheme is only applicable in departure-only group communication 
instead of the common conference groups. Secondly, we introduce our method 
of estimating the group size at a higher confidence level given a prior departure 
probability. Further, to enhance GDI protection and extend the application 
fields, we propose to protect GDI with two new mechanisms: chameleon 
member identifications and virtual departure events. The proposed scheme is 
effective to protect both centralized groups and contributory groups. The 
simulation shows that our scheme is better on protecting the GDI. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
With the development of network applications such as pay-TV, remote 
education and videoconference, secure multicast distribution of copyright- 
protected or confidential material is more and more important. At the heart 
of the applications, a center broadcasts encrypted data to a large group of 
receivers so that only a predefined subset is able to decrypt the protected 
data. Broadcast encryption2 deals with methods to efficiently broadcast 
information to a dynamically changing group of end members. It includes 
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three major modules: Registration, Join and ~ e ~ a r t u r e ~ .  Since the processing 
for registration and join requests is relatively easy, the main challenge in 
managing a group is how to exclude some subset of the members efficiently 
(e.g., Dodis et a ~ ~ ) .  Technically, this blacklisting Problem is how to 
distribute content decryption keys over a shared insecure channel so that 
only intended receivers can get the key efficiently in terms of key storage5 
andlor communication overhead6. Based on the survey7, the key 
management methods are categorized into two classes: (1). Centralized 
Group Key Management: A secure multicast scheme allows one or more 
group controllers (GCs) to send key updating messages securely over a 
multicast channel to a dynamically changing group of members8. For 
example, in logical-tree-hierarchy (LKH) scheme9 and LKH+" scheme, the 
leaf nodes represent the member keys, and the non-leaf nodes are key 
encryption keys (KEKs) which are used to encrypt the control traffic. 
Specially, the root represents the group key. (2). Contributory key 
management: There is no GC but each member has the same task in 
managing the group key so as to remove the bottleneck of GC and increase 
the security. For instance, Rodeh et al." divided the group members into 
sub-groups which have leaders. The leaders exchange keys on behalf of the 
sub-group members to agree a group key. 
The state-of-the-art key management schemes are designed to prevent 
unauthorized access to the multicast content, but unfortunately provide 
opportunities for unauthorized parties to obtain group dynamic information 
(GDI). That is to say, the number of join members, departure members and 
the size of the group are disclosed. As noted in Sun et al. scheme1 (hereafter 
called as SL scheme): "some applications such as subscription services, and 
military, it is highly undesirable to disclose instant detailed dynamic 
membership information to competitors, who would develop effective 
competition strategies by analyzing the statistical behavior of the audience." 
Sun et al.' not only described the leakage of GDI in the existing key 
management schemes, but also improved the design of current key 
management schemes such that both GDI and the multicast content are 
protected. Technically, Sun et al. proposed a protection method by batch re- 
keying and phantom members. Their upgraded scheme provided some 
protection on the GDI, but we think it is not sufficient in terms of 
applications and security strength. 
The present paper focuses on the protection of group dynamics, in 
particular to the large scale group because the adversary is hard to accurately 
estimate the GDI of a small group. Since non-tree-based schemes (e.g. 
Safaeli et aL7) are merely applicable for small groups, we deal with the 
binary tree-based scheme only in the following sections. We denote a path as 
the node sequence from leaf to root. The path length is the number of nodes 
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in the path. l(x) represents the number of nodes in the path from node x to 
root. Particularly, the depth of the root is 0. Each key has a field SN 
Sequence Number which indicates the position of a key in the tree. Our main 
contributions include: ( I )  address the security flaw of the scheme'; (2). 
propose methods to protect GDI with virtual events and chameleon 
members. The proposed schemes are effective in protecting both centralized 
group and contributory group. 
The remainder of the present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
refreshes the SL scheme. Section 3 addresses our analysis on SL scheme. 
Section 4 depicts our proposed GDI protection method and its extension to 
contributory group key management. Section 5 describes the comparison 
between SL scheme and our scheme. A conclusion is drawn in Section 6. 
2. SL HIDING SCHEME 
In many group communications, group dynamic information is 
confidential and should not be disclosed to either inside group members or 
outsiders. An important goal in SL scheme1 is to produce an observed re- 
keying process that reveals the least amount of information about the GDI. 
The tools in SL scheme to hide GDI include batch re-keying and phantom 
member insertion. 
Periodical batch re-keying is to postpone the updates of keys such that 
several members can be added to or removed from the key tree altogether. 
Compared with updating keys immediately after each member joins or 
departures, batch re-keying reduces the communication overhead at the 
expense of allowing the joininglleaving member to access a small amount of 
information beforelafter his joinldeparture. But batch updating provides little 
contribution for the GDI protection if the attacker can intercept and parse the 
re-keying messages. 
Phantom members inserting is a way to hide the number of the real 
members. These phantom members, as well as their join and departure 
behavior, are created by GC. As a result, the combined effects of the 
phantom members and the real members lead to an artificial GDI which is 
observed by the attackers. 
According to notation in SL scheme, Nk, Jk and Lk are the number of the 
real members, and the real join event, and real departure event at time k 
respectively, N,(k), J,(k) and L,(k) are the total number of members, total 
number of join events, and total number of departure events respectively. 
N,(k), J,(k), and L,(k) are referred to as the artificial GDI whose target values 
are No, Jo and & respectively. Thus, the artificial GDI functions are: 
N O W  = max { Nk, NO 1 (1) 
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JAk) = max { Jk, Lk, b 1 
L,(k) = N,(k-1) - N,(k) + J,(k) 
Due to Eq.(l), the number of key tree leaves is that of the real members if 
Nk 2 No. Therefore, an attacker can estimate the group size if he is permitted 
to join the group without limitation. For example, an attacker floods No join 
requests to GC so as to exclude all phantom members. Thanks to the group 
size technologies described in Section 3,  the attacker can obtain the GDI 
easily. To defeat this attack, Nk must always be less than No by imposing 
some limitations on the join requests, for example, restrict the number of 
join requests by checking the identification of the requestor. 
3. DISCLOSING GDI PROTECTED WITH SL 
SCHEME 
This section describes an approach to estimate GDI protected with 
methods in SL scheme. To this end, subsection 3.1 firstly introduces how to 
estimate the group size with the tree depth since a key-tree tends to be 
balanced in a long term communication. Secondly, Subsection 3.2 describes 
how to refine the key-tree with the key SNs based on the re-keying 
messages. Finally, the number of real members is estimated thanks to some 
prior knowledge on the member departure. 
3.1 Step 1: Grossly estimating the group size 
Generally, the key-tree is changed from time to time due to the group 
dynamics. However, the tree will tend to some stationary status with the 
updating strategy in SL scheme: (1) The number of tree leaves is invariable, 
i.e., the umber of departure members is equal to that of the join members at 
any updating time. ( 2 )  Every member (i.e., tree leaf) has the same departure 
probability, but the join member is always located in the shortest path for the 
sake of lightest communication overhead. 
This subsection discloses the key-tree asymptotic property in SL scheme 
to estimate the number of tree leaves. Denote the initial tree as To, the tree is 
Tk at time k. is the length of the longest path and lmin,k is the length of 
the shortest path in the tree Tk. 
Theorem: If a join member is always mounted in the shortest path, and a 
member departures from any leaf at an identical probability, an arbitrary 
binary tree will tend to be balanced given a departure event is always 
followed by a join event. Formally, let P(X) to be the probability of random 
variable X, lim k+,-. P(lmaxtk - I1)=1 
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Proof: see appendix. 
Although the theorem is expressed for two events at each updating time, 
it holds for any even number of events. Consequentially, the key tree will 
tend to be a balanced tree if the probability of departure event is identical to 
that of join event. Thus the size of re-keying messages is almost constant for 
each departure event23 in a long term. For example, Fig. 1 illustrates the 
dynamic property of the key tree. Initially, the tree of depth 10 is very 
unbalanced ( l m , o  - l,in,o = 8), but lmax,k - lminrk is smaller and smaller with 
more and more events, i.e., the tree is more and more balanced. Because lmin,k 
andlor lm,k are publicly available from the re-keying messages, the 
adversary estimates the group size NO as 
21tn~n.k < N~ < 2 l m d x . k  
for a sufficiently large k. This method grossly estimates the group size 
without employing the re-keying message content. In the following, the 
adversary exploits the key SNs from the re-keying messages so as to refine 
the number of tree leaves. 
I 
0 50 100 150 200 250 
Number of events 
Figure 1. Tree depth difference dynamics. With more and more jointdeparture events, the 
difference lm, - lm i ,  tends to 1. 
3.2 Step 2: Refining the estimation 
Assume at time to, the attacker starts to monitor the network traffic so as 
to reconstruct the key tree at time to. To accomplish this, the adversary 
analyzes the re-keying messages one by one and updates the reconstructing 
23 In the Subsection 11-C of SL  scheme, the departure position (L1 ,  h_, ..., Lw) is assumed to 
be i.i.d. We think this assumption is not true for a long duration communication. Thus, the 
attack A11 addressed SL  scheme is impractical. 
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key tree with the following heuristic knowledge: for each departure event, if 
the departure member does not join after to, the member must be in To ; for 
each join event, the new leaf position must be empty in To unless it is blank 
due to the departure events after to. 
Since phantom members are added into the group such that the group size 
is invariable in SL scheme, i.e., N,(k)= No, what the adversary obtains is the 
artificial size No which includes the number of the phantom members. 
Therefore, the adversary has to filter out the number of phantom members 
with the following method. 
3.3 Step 3: Filtering the phantom members 
According to the on member departure, the member 
arrival process can be modelled as Poisson; the membership duration of 
short sessions is accurately modelled using an exponential distribution; and 
the membership duration of long sessions is accurately modeled using the 
Zipf distribution ( h t t p :  //www. u s e i t .  c o m / a l e r t b o x / z i p f  . h t m l )  . 
Therefore, the adversary is able to exploit the difference between real 
member and phantom member. The former departures at its own probability 
which may be available in advance with the domain knowledge, and the 
departure probability of the latter is decided by GC. Before elaborate the 
process of estimating the real members, let's play a game. 
Game: With respect to Fig.2, there are 2 boxes called GI and G2. The 
first box GI has a black balls and b white balls, another box Gz has x black 
balls and y white balls, where a,  b, x+y=N are known, but x and y are 
unknown. At each time, one ball will be taken from the boxes. 
Figure 2. Experiments for simulating group dynamics. The black balls represent real 
members, while white balls represent the phantom members. The tested members map to the 
balls in box GI.  
The rules for taking balls with repetition are as follows: 
(1) the black balls will be taken with a predefined probability f. Each 
black ball has the same probability to be taken. 
(2) only after no black ball is taken in step ( I ) ,  the white balls will be 
selected uniformly. Define the random events 
XI:  a black ball taken from the first box GI 
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X2: a white ball taken from the first box GI 
X3: a black ball taken from the second box G2 
X4: a white ball taken from the second box G2 
Then the probability of the taken ball is from the first box G1 as 
Given that the number of balls in the first box is much smaller than that of 
the second one (a+b <( x+y),  and the observer can tell which box the ball is 
taken from, but he can not tell the color of the taken ball. After many 
experiments (return the ball to the original box), the occurrence frequency a 
of balls taken from the first box is 
That is to say, the observer can estimate the number of white (or black) 
balls according to Eq.(2) and Eq.(3). Referencing to Table 1, the adversary 
selects all the joining members as a tested set of members at a updating time, 
and other members are regarded as non-tested. With the following ways, an 
adversary can obtain the parameters to play the game on the GDI. 
In an updating period, the attacker can detect all the requests ('join and/or 
departure) by eavesdropping the network. Equally, the attacker knows a 
in the above experiment. Meanwhile, the attacker can deduce the number 
b from a re-keying message in the same period. But the attacker can not 
distinguish the real members from the phantom members due to batch 
updating. Thus, the adversary can construct a box G1. 
The number N of the old members (balls in G2) is known based on 
Subsections 3.1 and 3.2. 
Since GC does not remove a real member otherwise the victim will 
protest. Thus, the real member will quit at her own probability f. 
According to the experiments13, the probability f may be available. 
A phantom member can be selected and excluded uniformly if no real 
member quits. 
Careful readers may notice some minor difference between the non- 
tested set and G2 in that non-tested set may be changed from time to time, 
while the balls in G2 are identical all the time. But we think this difference 
will not incure big estimation error if a+b <( N. In addition, the game 
simplifies the group dynamics with only one ball leaving at each time, 
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However, it can be extended to multiple balls leaving like the case of batch 
updating. 
Strictly speaking, f varies with the number of real members. To increase 
the estimation off ,  we can repeat the above experiment with the estimated 
number x till the difference between two estimations is smaller than a 
threshold. As a result, the number x of real members is estimated according 
to the above game. 
Table I. Mapping the game to GDI. #X: the size of X 
Game GDI 
GI tested balls tested real members 
G2 non-tested balls non-tested members 
a #black balls in G I  # tested real members 
b #white balls in G I  # tested phantom members 
x #black balls in G2 # non-tested real members 
Y #white balls in G2 # non-tested phantom members 
N # balls in G2 # non-tested members 
f probability of black ball leaving probability of real member leaving 
4. PRESENT GDI PROTECTION SCHEME 
The present approach employs chameleon ID and virtual member switch 
for hiding GDI. Chameleon ID means that each user has more than one ID, 
or multiple leaf positions in the key tree; and virtual member switch is to 
remove an innocent member and then artificially insert him again. With 
these technologies, as well as batch updating and phantom members, the 
phantom member and real member are statistically indistinguishable such 
that the estimation method in Section 3 is of no use. 
4.1 Chameleon Members 
In the SL scheme', the approach of inserting phantom members provides 
GDI protection to some degree. But it may be vulnerable in the group 
communication, in particular to conferences because the phantom members 
are always silent. If the attacker treats the members who are dumb for a long 
time as phantom members, the attacker is able to separate the real members 
from the phantom members. Therefore, the protection methods in SL scheme 
are merely applicable to the content delivery, i.e., one member acts as a 
server or speaker, and others are listeners. 
In order to hide GDI in all kinds of the group communications, we 
propose a GDI protection based on the idea of chameleon IDS. Fig.3 
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illustrates the response process of join event with chameleon IDS. The 
request message is RM=(JOIN, M, E(IDlln, K) ) ,  where E(.) is an encryption 
function, ID is a random number for identifying the requestor M, and key K 
is known to both GC and the requestor and n is the number of chameleon 
IDS for the requestor M. 
With the secret key K, GC obtains ID and n by decrypting RM and stores 
them for virtual departure (see Subsection 4.2), then unicasts a response 
{IDi, E(Ci, K)}" (i=1,2, . . ., n) to the requestor, where ID;=H(ID 1 1  i), Ci is a 
set of re-keying messages (SN,, K I S N .  ), SNj is the key sequence number in 
J 
the whole key tree. Here, assume that the attacker can intercept all the re- 
keying messages but can not identify whether the recipients of two messages 
are identical or not. To be efficient, a weaker assumption is that the attacker 
can not identify a majority of recipients of the re-keying messages. KlsNj is 
derived from the old KsNj  with a one-way function. Hence the requestor 
joins the group as n members. Because all the IDi are non-linkable and the 
number of artificial join requests is unknown to the attacker, the attacker can 
not distinguish the real join re-keying message from the artificial ones. 
Furthermore, the chameleon IDS are used at the same probability in the 
communication sessions such that no dumb members exist. 
GC Requestor 
Figure 3. Diagram for member join. After receiving the join request from a new member, GC 
adds several leaves in the key tree for the new member. 
4.2 Virtual Departure 
In the attack proposed in Section 3, the adversary exploits the statistics 
difference between the real member and phantom member. In order to hide a 
prior departure probability of real members, GC will exclude a real member, 
afterwards let her join. To accomplish this virtual departure, GC will select 
an innocent member, send the exclusion message as usual. Optionally, not 
all of her chameleon IDS are removed such that the member can still involve 
in the group communication and postpone the join process to a later time. 
When an innocent member is revoked for no reason, she knows that she can 
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obtain a new key from the re-keying message sooner or later. For example, 
the re-keying messages with IDi=H(ID 11 n+t) indicates her new join KEKs, 
where t is the updating time. Therefore, the number of the members is 
invariable. Since either real member or phantom member has the same 
departure probability, the attack addressed in Section 3 is foiled. 
4.3 Mixed Departure with Join 
This section addresses a batch way to reduce the overhead efficiently. To 
deal with join and departure events simultaneously, whether the 
joitddeparture is virtual or real, all the keys from the removed leaf node to 
the root must be changed. Based on our observation in Section 3.1, most of 
leaves are located in D = Llogfid and D-1 levels. It is natural to insert the 
new members into the departure positions. The rules for processing the 
member departure are as follows: 
Prune the sub-trees which include all and exactly the departure members. 
For each remaining leaf node, if its sibling node departures, its new 
parent KEK is unicast to him securely. 
For each remaining internal node of level 1 < D-1, its new KEK will be 
multicast securely to the survival child node if only one child node is 
removed. Otherwise, if at least one of its non-immediate descendant node 
departures, its KEK is changed and multicast twice securely to its two 
children nodes. 
4.4 Extension to Contributory Group GDI Protection 
In the paper1, "Contributory key management schemes are generally not 
suitable for the applications with confidential GDI because each group 
member need to be aware of other group members in order to establish the 
shared group key in the distributed manner." However, this oracle is not true 
based on our chameleon IDS. 
Technically, in the setup stage of a contributory group key, the members 
broadcast the messages so that all the members share the same key. For the 
sake of clarity, we adopt the distributed LKH" to explain the protection 
process for contributory group communication. At the stage of forming a 
group key, each member has several chameleon IDS and each ID 
corresponds to a leaf of the key tree. After constructing the tree with Rodeh's 
scheme", the root is the shared key. In the conversation stage, the member 
talks with different IDS from time to time. In this protected contributory 
GDI, the height of the key tree is public, but the number of chameleon IDS of 
each member is secret, thus neither the insider nor the outsider can obtain the 
number of the real members. 
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In the Distributed LKH, the key tree depth increases log2 N1 -logz No if the 
number of members is increased from No to N,, thus the communication 
overhead and computational cost increases log, Nl-log, NO on average to 
achieve GDI protection. 
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Figure 4. Communication overhead vs. the number of departure events (x-axis). Given a 
group of 4000 members, the members leave the group uniformly. The overhead is represented 
with the number of re-keying messages. 
5. PERFORMANCE 
In the following simulations, suppose that the adversary knows the total 
number of members, as well as the departure probability of the real members. 
5.1 Network overhead 
With the proposed approach of batch departure in Subsection 4.3, the 
communication overhead are shown in Fig.4 and Fig.5. The size of re-keying 
messages of the proposed batch departure (solid line) is smaller than that in 
SL scheme (dashed line) since we do not multicast KEKs of pruned sub- 
trees. 
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Figure 5. Communication overhead vs. group size. Given 100 members leaves uniformly, the 
communication overhead increases slowly with the group size. 
5.2 GDI Protection Capacity 
5.2.1 Estimation on GDI protected with SL scheme 
Fig.6 illustrates the estimation result for the real members protected with 
SL scheme. With reference to Table I, assume GI includes a=10 real 
members and b=10 phantom members, and G2 has N=4000 members 
including x=1000 real members and y=3000 phantom members. The 
experiment is repeated with 10000 times, the departure probability f of the 
real member is selected as 0.01. Denote f i  as the estimated number of real 
members. Define E ( f i l N - 1 )  as the normalized estimation error. In Fig.6, 
mean error yo= / Mean(2) I =O. 15 and standard deviation oo=Var(z)= 
0.1232.From the experiments, we come to a conclusion that the size of the 
real members can be estimated to some extent. If the probability f is smaller, 
the estimation result is better. Thus, the attacker may select the time slice for 
estimation when few real members departure. 
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Exoeriments 
Figure 6. Estimation error of group size when GDI is protected with SL scheme. 
5.2.2 Estimation of GDI protected with our protocol 
Fig.7 illustrates the estimation result for the real members protected with the 
virtual departure. Its configuration parameters are the same as those in 
Subsection 5.2.1. In Fig.8, the mean error p1= 1 Mean@) I = 0.3458 >b. 
And the standard deviation ol=Var(Z)=0.587 > 00. It means that the virtual 
departure results in much greater estimation error, and the estimation results 
are not stable due to high variance. 
With the same parameters as Fig. 6, Fig. 8 illustrates the estimation result 
for the real members protected with chameleon IDS (here the number of 
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Exoeriments 
Figure 7. Estimation error of group size when CDI is protected with virtual departure. 
Exoeriments 
Figure 8. Estimation error of group size when CDI is protected with chameleon IDS. 
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chameleon ID is equal to the real member). The mean of estimation error 
p2= I Mean(Z) 1 =0.476 >> h, and standard deviation 02=Var(Z)=0.2956>oo. 
Therefore, the estimated number of real members is far from true value, and 
the estimation results are not stable due to high variance. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper investigates the protection schemes of hiding GDI and points 
out the security flaw in SL scheme. We further propose a method to protect 
GDI, such as the number of group members, from disclosing. In this paper, 
we consider the membership dynamic in the whole process including set up, 
joidleave, and communication session. Although the adversary is assumed 
to have more knowledge (e.g., knowing the key tree) than that in SL scheme, 
she is unable to even closely approximate the number of real members due to 
the technologies of chameleon IDS and virtual departure. In addition, our 
method is applicable to both centralized group and contributory group. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Theorem 1 :  Let D= Llogz N ~ J .  The member set Uk={Mi I I(Mi)> D ) is 
defined after the updating time k, but before the updating time k+l,  where Mi is a 
node in the tree, I(x) is the depth of a leaf x. 
Define two events as Departure event ek and Join event Ek at time k. 
( 1 )  The leaves in Uk will vanish gradually. 
Because N,(k)=No 5 2D, the join member will be inserted into the levels smaller 
than D+l.  Thus, the join event has no im act on Uk. Thus, Uo c U I  c . . . , the size of 
Uk is monotonically deceasing, I Uo 1 2 7 U I  I 1 . . . 1 0 
Denote the departure event of member rn as 
1 :  m E U k - l  
ek =(  0 :  otherwise 
If I Uk-I I >O, P(ek=l) = I Uk.1 k~~ 2 l /NO. Considering el, e2, ... are independent, 
for any arbitrary positive c l ,  there is some c such that 
P(E1 +E2+ ...+ Ec= / uO)2 i.e., P ( I  U, I=0) 2 l - ~ ~ .  
(2) The leaves in any level 1< D-1 will vanish gradually. 
Assume the length of the shortest path is l,in,o<D-I initially, and Sk is the set of 
the leaves in level l,h,o. At time k ,  denote the departure event of member rn as 
1 :  m P S k  
~k = {  0 :  otherwise 
Suppose no= I SO I is the number of leaves in the level l,in,o at the initial time. Due 
to P(Ek=l)= I Sk I /NO 2 IINo, if I Sk I f 0, for any arbitrary positive ez >O, there is 
some r such that 
P ( E l  +E2+ ...+ E k = n o )  2 i.e., P(IS,I =0) 2 1- E ~ .  
According to Eq.( l ) ,  the leaves in the shortest path will disappear gradually. That 
is to say, the length of shortest path will increase. Repeat the above steps, the 
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shortest path will be longer and longer till D-1 at the probability of at least l-cz. That 
is to say, for any level I= l,h,o, . . . , 0 - 2 ,  there is some rl, no leaves exist at all given 
arbitrary positive ~2 after rl join events. 
( 3 )  After sufficient number of events, there is no leaf x where either I(x)>D or 
l(x)d)-1 at a high probability. Formally, For any arbitrary positive E = min(el, E ~ ) ,  
after updating 8 times, the leaves are in levels D and D-1 at the probability at least 
1 -E, where 
